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l 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiff Appellant (Rice, Melby Enterprises, Inc.), Cr;· 
action for rescission of a land sale contract which Defer,c:· 
Respondent (Salt Lake County), induced by the promise of deve::>! 
ment and the threat of condemnation. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court of the Third Judicial District grw 
Defendant's mot ion for summary judgment. Fr om that judgr: 
Plaintiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
I 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of order of the District Co I 
granting summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1970, Robert L. Rice, President of then Rice, 
Landserr; Investments, Inc., was approached by representatives 
Salt Lake County. These representatives informed Mr. Rice:·, 
I 
the County in tended to deve 1 op a public park west of real c'.:'1 
erty which Rice, Melby, Landsem Investment, Inc., owned at• 
d .I Highland Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah. The County indicate :J 
in order to develop the park, it would be necessary to acq,! 
d b · .I 
real property located not only on the parcel of land owne 1 ' 
corporation, but on a neighboring parcel owned by a third c: 
I 
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as we 11. (Affidavit of Robert L. Rice p. 1) [hereinafter cited 
as A ff id av a it l . 
The real property owned by the Corporation has been used 
from that time to the present as a health spa facility. The 
corporation did not wish to part with this property because it 
~uld make any future expansion both difficult and costly. 
davit p. 2). 
(Affi-
The County, however, prevailed upon the Corporation to sell 
the property at a bargain price. The County induced this sale by a 
threat coupled with a promise. 
The threat was condemnation. The County indicated that in 
the event the Corporation chose not to sell the property, the 
County would exercise its power of eminent domain. The County 
also inforrned the Corporation that, it would exercise its power 
to condemn the neighboring parcel belonging to a third party as 
well. (Affidavit p. 1). The Corporation recognized the apparent 
futility of refusing to sell and subsequently sold the property 
to the County. 
The promise was development. The development of the public 
park would have enhanced the real property on which the Corpora-
tion was located. It would further have saved the Corporation 
the expense of building additional facilities such as a jogging 
track. The benefits of the promised park development encouraged 
the Corporation to settle for the final bargain price of seventy 
four thousand nine hundred forty dollars and sixty two cents 
($74,940.62). This price would have been unavailable to a dif-
ferent third party. [Affidavit p. l] (Contract for Sale of Real 
- 2 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Property p. 1). 
The Corporation and the County entered into the writ 
contract for sale on September 20, 1970. More than lO )'; 
have passed since the sale and the County, far from develc~ 
the park, has failed to acquire the neighboring acreage w·. 
they represented was needed to make development feasible. 
In the past ten (10) years demand on the health spa: 
ilities, at the site owned by the corporation, have increas;d 
expected. A jogging track, which would have been unnecessary 
the park been developed as promised, is being built. This, 
itional construction has eliminated some needed parking areas~ 
would have been available had the Corporation been able to re:. 
the use of the property sold. (Affidavit p.2). 
Because the County has failed to develop the park as prorr; 
and apparently would not even have condemned the property if 
Corporation had refused to sell; the Corporation filed an actio; 
District Court seeking rescission of the contract or alternati'. 
damages. 
ARGUMENT 
This Court held in Whitman v. W.T. Grant Co. 16 Utah 2c 
395 P. 2d 918 ( 1964) that when it hears an appeal from an O! 
granting summary judgment it will view the facts in favor of 
appealing party. Based on those facts and the following poin:: 
argument, this Court should reverse the District Court's c! 
granting summary judgment. 
- 3 -
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point 1. STATUTORY PROVISONS WAIVE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY AND 
OBVIATE THE REQUIREMENTS OF NOTICE AND UNDERTAKING. 
Section 63-30-5, Utah Code Anno., 1954, as amended, provides: 
"Waiver of immunity as to obligation. - Immunity from suit of 
all governmental entities is waived as to any contractual obliga-
tion and actions arising out of contractual rights or obligations 
shall not be subject to the requirements of sections 63-30-12, 
63-30-13 or 63-30-19 of this act." 
The County, in its supplemental memorandum supporting summary 
Judgment, asserts that the Corporation's causes of action do not 
arise out of contractual rights and obligations and, therefore, do 
not come within the purview of 63-30-5. The County at tempts to 
limit contractual rights and obligations to those found on the four 
corners of the document. Such a narrow interpretation is not 
justified. This Court stated in Lamb v. Bangart 525 P.2d 602, 608 
(Utah, 1974) "P._ contract limitation on damages or remedies is valid 
only in the absence of allegations or proof of fraud." Implicit in 
this statement is the fact that any contract inherently carries 
with it the contractual right to seek a remedy for fraud, misrep-
resentation, or duress regardless of whether said remedy is ex-
pressly provided for in the contract. The Corporation's cause of 
action does, therefore, arise out of a con tr actual right; conse-
quently 63-30-5 waives governmental immunity, the notice require-
ments under 63-30-12, 63-30-13, and the undertaking requirement of 
63-30-19. 
However, even if the Court found that the notice requirement 
•as required prior to the institution of the instant case, the 
- A -
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Utah Supreme Court in El Rancho Enterprises v. Murray~ 
(Utah, 1977), upheld the premise tna: 565 P.2d 778 
equitable claim may be brought against a governmental body wit: 
the necessity of first presenting a claim for damages and: 
governmental immunity may not be used as a defense to egultc:. 
claims. The equitable claim in that case was based on contracc., 
claims regarding real property. 
Futhermore, there is a question of fact raised in the pk' 
ings that the County was and has been acting in a propri":: 
manner rather than a governmental manner. Under the holdir.~ 
Standiford v. Salt Lake, 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah, 1980), a municipa:.i 
failing to act in a governmental function is not shielded b•· · 
J. I 
I 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Furthermore, the County admits receipt of written comrnu~.:: 1 
I 
tion seeking a reconveyance of the property which would fulf.:! 
the notice requirement if such is required. See: letter attac:c:' 
to Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum Supporting its Mot: 
for Summary Judgment. 
Therefore, by statute, equity, policy, and the facts,t:; 
County's motion for summary judgment based on governmental irnrru:·:j' 
should not have been granted. The County, by choosing to purc .. oo 
the property by contract rather than condemn it, waived its i;'..: 
ity. 
Point 2. BOTH DURESS AND MISREPRESENTATION EXIST IN THE CASE 
AT BAR. 
The contract in the case at bar was induced by duress. 
misrepresentation. 
- c:; -· 
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Duress existed in that the parties to the contract were not 
negotiating from positions of equal strength. The County wielded 
the power of eminent domain and threatened condemnation if the 
corporation refused to sell. Acting under this duress, the Corpor-
ation sold the property. Nevertheless, the County failed to 
acquire, either by sale or condemnation the neighboring parcel. 
The County had represented that the neighboring parcel was neces-
sary for development of the park and that they would condemn it. 
The County's failure to acquire the neighboring parcel evidences 
that the County threatened condemnation when it would not in fact 
have condemned the property. 
Because the County threatened condemn at ion when it was not 
disposed to do so, the Corporation seeks to rescind the contract 
mder the theory of duress. 
The County in its memorandum supporting summary judgrrent 
quite appropriately points out that this Court in Fox v. Piercey, 
227 P.2d 763 (Utah, 1951) held Under all authorities, 
ancient and modern, the act or threat constituting duress must be 
wrongful" . The County takes the position that threatening condem-
nation is a legal right, therefore rightful, and consequently not 
duress. However, the County did not merely threaten condemnation, 
it threatened condemnation when it was not prepared to conderrn, 
which is wrongful. 
The misrepresentations in the present case are two-fold. 
First, as previously mentioned, the County threatened condemnation 
While being unprepared to condemn. Had the Corporation been aware 
of the County's true disposition, the property would not have been 
- 6 -.. 
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sold. Second, the County represented that it was acquir 
property with the intent to develop a park. More than ter, 
years has passed since the promise of development was made ar'. 
is now obvious that the County was no more disposed to deve1o:, 
promised, than it was to condemn, as threatened. 
It is obvious that the County's power of errinent domain '•: .. ' 
give it a decided advantage over other purchasers in any negc> 
tion for the sale of land. It is incumbent on the County to.:· 
that power responsibly. It is not responsible to use the power .. 
eminent domain as a threat to acquire property while being unp:;· 
pared to consummate the threatened action. Neither is it res~'" 
sible to promise developrrent while being undisposed to de: 
Point 3. PLAINTIFF JUSTIFIABLY RELIED ON DEFENDANT'S PROMISE 
TO DEVELOP A PARK AND IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES ARISrnG 
FROM THAT RELIANCE. 
The Corporation is entitled to rely upon the representar;:·• 
made by the County. 
This court has not had occassion to rule on what may res.::J 
I frorr this reliance as 
State 586 P.2d 1236, 
§_~at~, 560 P.2d 36, 
has the Supreme Court of Alaska. In Also:· 
1239 (Alaska, 1978) it stated, "In =1 
39 (Alaska 1977), we held that while J 
state is not bound to abide by its construction plans, 
to condemnation proceedings are entitled to rely on the 
announced plans. Further, we held that when such plans 
part:' 
I 





implemented, any further economic interference with the conderrr.:'·f 
property which results constitutes a second taking for whiC .! 
state must pay just compensation." 
- 7 -
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I 
I 
Although the Corporation was not a party to condemnation 
iroceedings, the sale was induced by the threat to condemn cou-
pled with the promise to develop the land. The promise provid-
ed valuable consideration in that it made planned construction 
of additional health facilities unnecessary. The consideration 
paid for the property, therefore, was not only the cash price of 
seventy four thousand nine hundred two dollars and sixty two cents 
[$74, 902. 62), but the promised development as well. Failure to 
carry out the promised development constituted a "second taking" 
~r which the County must pay adequate consideration. 
The Corporation is, therefore, entitled to damages incurred in 
~trimentally relying on the County's promised development, in that 
Plaintiff had to construct additional facilities, (as pointed out 
1n Robert Rice's aff id a vi t) which would have been unneccesary had 
~fendant complied with its promise. 
~int 4. PLAINTIFFS CAUSES OF ACTION EXTEND THE STATUTE OF 
LIMIATIONS. 
1 The Corporation has commenced suit within the statute of 
,I limitations and is not subject to laches. The County had cited a 
number of statute of limitations in seeking summary judgment; 
however, it has not addressed itself as to when the statute of 
l~itations begins to run. See: Defendant's Memorandum Supporting 
its Motion for Summary Judgment. 
25 Am Jur 2nd, Duress and Undue Influence, Section 28 (1966), 
States that it is held to be incumbent upon one from whom property 
- 8 -
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has been obtained by duress to avoid the con tr act when re lee:, 
from the duress. 
states that a right of action upon a contract does not accrue,. 
the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the cont12 .. 
is to be performed. 
The contract in the case at bar was induced by duress 2.: 
misrepresentation. In cases of duress or misrepresentation, t·: 
running of the statute of limitations may be delayed until .;i' 
covery of the misrepresentation or release from the duress. '.:• 
policy reason for extending the statute of limitation in thi• 
cases is that a plaintiff would not have the opportunity to pur:.; 
his action until he had either discovered the misrepresentatior,-
been released from the duress. Neither occurence of which coi;:: 
have been determined in the instant case until after the pass;: 
of a reasonable all'ount of time for the development of the ;;:• 
or the acquisition of the neighboring parcel. 
The nature of the County's representation and duress,: 
conder.m and develop a park within a reasonable time, extends:·: 
statute of limitations as to all of Plaintiff's causes of act:c 
Even if we assume arguendo that there is no misrepresentation 
duress in the case at bar the statute of limitations is exte~;' 
for the Corporation's action for reliance damages; for the Cor;:·I 
ation could not have discovered the failure of the pror.iised ::' 
siderations, (the park development) until a reasonable urr.e ::j 
passed. 
- 9 -
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~int 5. PLAINTIFF'S CAUSES OF ACTION DO NOT VIOLATE THE PAROL 
EVIDENCE RULE. 
The Corporation's causes of action under theories of duress 
and mispresentations do not violate the parol evidence rule. 
J40, (1960) the Court stated: 
"The rule forbidding parol evidence to vary the terms of a 
11fitten agreeirent applies only to evidence which is offered to 
~we the meaning of the original contract". 
In the instant case, the Corporation's cause of action is not 
based on the interpretation of the written contract, but is based 
on matters of misrepresentation and duress - the proof of which 
'1ill not violate the parol evidence rule and is not lirr.ited by the 
Statute of Frauds. 
The Corporation's cause of action for reliance on the County's 
promise to develop the park, (which promise was part of the con-
sideration for the transfer of the property) does not violate 
the parol evidence rule either. 
Even though the promise to develop was not included in the 
1 written contract for sale it is well established that the parol 
evidence rule does not bar the introduction of parol evidence to 
reflect the true consideration of the parties. State v. Tucson 
(Ariz., 1966), Wentz v. 
~~f i c _§_ta !_~.§.2~ v i ~9:.§. ~-Lo a ~-f_~ , 5 Ar i z . 5 0 8 , 8 3 P • 2 d l O O 6 
11933); Cashion v. Bank of Arizona, 30 Ariz. 172, 245 P.360 (1926). 
- 10 -
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Point 6. PLAINTIFF Is CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS HAVE BEEN IMPf\IPCL, 
The Utah and the U.S. Constitution both provide that t:, 
shall be no deprivation of private property by a govern~e.:'. 
agency without just compensation. 
CONST. art. 1 § 22. 
U.S. CONST. amend. V, ::· 
The Corporation's constitutional rights have been viola: 
because just compensation has not been tendered for the Corpe: 
tion's property. The Corporation relied on the County's pro~i: 
development and in fact sold the property for a lower cash p: 
than it would have had it not so relied. The County's failuro 
develop the park has caused the Corporation additional econo· 
hardship, which constitutes a "second taking" for which the Cor': 
ation has not been compensated. 
The legislature, in granting the power of eminent doratn 
the County, has specified the manner in which that power of em.: 
domain may be used by providing statutes to safeguard the right: 
pr iv ate citizens and ensuring "just compensation". Utah Code;,: 
§ 78-34-1--18. 
It is inconceivable and perhaps unconstitutional for a gov:r 
mental entity to misuse this power by threatening its use, :: 
gaining a decided advantage in negotiations for a contractual"· 
Indeed, the eminent domain statutes provide a means for deterff 
tion of the fair market value of real property so as to pro'-
just compensation to pr iv ate citizens. By the County's choice 
sought to obtain the property through contractual means rather: 
the powers of eminent domain. By so doing, the County ?L. 
- 11 -
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itself in the same position as a private citizen with regard to 
the Corporation. Therefore, it was unconscionable and unconstitu-
tional for the Defendant to threaten use of its governmental power 
when it was acting as a private citizen. Such misuse violates the 
constitutional safeguards. A county government has no inherent 
right of eminent domain but receives it only from the sovereign 
~ state. The state, in providing the powers of eminent domain to the 
county has provided specific means by which that power may be 
i~lemented. An abuse of that power by skirting the means by which 
it may be used is in violation of the rights and protections 
afforded private citizens and Plaintiff in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The Corporation maintains that inasmuch as the County threat-
ened condemnation when it was unprepared to condemn, and promised 
development when it was unprepared to develop; that said misrepre-
sentations justify rescission of the land sale contract and evid-
ence a possible unconstitutional exercise of the power of eminent 
domain. The Corporation further maintains that even in the absence 
of misrepresentation it was entitled to rely on the promised 
development as partial consideration and collect damages for the 
County's failure to develop as promised. 
Because Plaintiff does state a claim for which relief can 
be granted, it respectfully submits that the order of the lower 
court granting summary judgment be reversed. 
Respectfully Submitted. 
~_C\~---
Thomas J. Klc ~~ 
- 12 -
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